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Background. Significant quantities of antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) to treat HIV/AIDS have been procured for Sub-Saharan Africa
for the first time in their 20-year history. This presents a novel opportunity to empirically study the roles of brand and generic
suppliers in providing access to ARVs. Methodology/Principal Findings. An observational study of brand and generic supply
based on a dataset of 2,162 orders of AIDS drugs for Sub-Saharan Africa reported to the Global Price Reporting Mechanism at
the World Health Organization from January 2004-March 2006 was performed. Generic companies supplied 63% of the drugs
studied, at prices that were on average about a third of the prices charged by brand companies. 96% of the procurement was
of first line drugs, which were provided mostly by generic firms, while the remaining 4%, of second line drugs, was sourced
primarily from brand companies. 85% of the generic drugs in the sample were manufactured in India, where the majority of
the drugs procured were ineligible for patent protection. The remaining 15% was manufactured in South Africa, mostly under
voluntary licenses provided by brand companies to a single generic company. In Sub-Saharan African countries, four first line
drugs in the dataset were widely patented, however no general deterrent to generic purchasing based on a patent was
detected. Conclusions/Significance. Generic and brand companies have played distinct roles in increasing the availability of
ARVs in Sub-Saharan Africa. Generic companies provided most of the drugs studied, at prices below those charged by brand
companies, and until now, almost exclusively supplied several fixed-dose combination drugs. Brand companies have supplied
almost all second line drugs, signed voluntary licenses with generic companies, and are not strictly enforcing patents in certain
countries. Further investigation into how price reductions in second line drugs can be achieved and the cheapest drugs can
actually be procured is warranted.
Citation: Chien CV (2007) HIV/AIDS Drugs for Sub-Saharan Africa: How Do Brand and Generic Supply Compare?. PLoS ONE 2(3): e278. doi:10.1371/
journal.pone.0000278
INTRODUCTION
An aggressive drive to increase access to antiretroviral drugs
(ARVs) by HIV-infected patients in developing countries is
underway. An unprecedented level of resolve and funding,
channeled through the Global Fund to treat AIDS, Malaria, and
Tuberculosis (the Global Fund), and the U.S. President’s
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), has been directed
at various treatment targets, the most ambitious of which is the G8
goal of universal access by 2010 [1].
Although more than drugs will be needed to reach these goals,
scaling up treatment will require a reliable and affordable supply
of ARVs. However, to date, comprehensive empirical data on the
characteristics and determinants of this supply are scarce. While
a number of reports have focused on price [2–3], an under-
standing of the role of brand and generic suppliers is currently
lacking. This understanding could be used to inform strategies to
increase the availability of affordable and appropriate ARVs. Such
strategies are critical to bolstering the short-term credibility of
scale up efforts and long-term sustainability of treatment as drugs
must be taken for the lifetime of a patient, and donor funds such as
the Global Fund have already faced shortfalls [4].
Comparisons between brand and generic procurement of ARVs
also have relevance to questions about how access to patented
medicines by patients in developing countries can be achieved. To
encourage generic production of patented medicines, the rights of
countries to practice patented inventions without patentholder
permission–through a practice called ‘‘compulsory licensing’’–
have been affirmed and expanded through the Doha Declaration
and the permanent amendment of a core agreement of the World
Trade Organization [5]. Yet there has been little empirical
analysis of the extent to which these and other mechanisms have
actually encouraged generic supply.
Since December 2003, the World Health Organization (WHO)
has collected transaction data about purchases of ARVs for
developing countries through the Global Price Reporting Mechan-
ism (GPRM) [6]. This dataset presents the opportunity to do an
observational study of the procurement of brand and generic
HIV/AIDS drugs and consider its implications for scaling up.
METHODS
Data on 2,162 orders of ARVs in oral solid (adult) formulation for
Sub-Saharan Africa from January 2004 to March 2006 were
obtained from the GPRM. The GPRM tracks ARV procurement
of UN organizations, the Global Fund, and government and NGO
purchasers [7]. WHO estimates that GPRM orders represented
50% of the total procurement of ARVs for Sub-Saharan Africa in
2005 (written communication with WHO). The GPRM reports
the total number of units transacted and the quantity of compound
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 March 2007 | Issue 3 | e278per unit. Quantities of compound were converted into patient-year
equivalents using WHO dosing guidelines [8]. Prices were reported
exclusive of taxes, tariffs, and transportation costs, and drug
donations were excluded from the analysis. Orders were coded as
‘‘generic’’ or ‘‘brand’’ based on the manufacturer listed on each
order. Additional information on the regulatory, patent, voluntary
license, and price discount status of various compounds was
obtained from published accounts. Information on oral and
powder (child) formulations was not included in the analysis due to
the difficulty of calculating patient-year equivalent quantities
associated with variations in pediatric weight.
RESULTS
Supplier and Price Patterns
Sixty-three percent of the volume of the ARVs in the dataset was
ordered from generic companies, and 37% from brand companies
(Table 1). Brand prices were on average three times more expen-
sive than generic prices (Table 1), however supply patterns for
individual drugs and drug segments varied widely (Table S1). In
addition, price variation across countries and orders was observed.
First v. second line drugs
In single and combination form, five drugs dominated the pro-
curement studied, representing 96% of the ARVs ordered
(Table 1). These five drugs–stavudine (d4T), zidovudine (AZT),
lamivudine (3TC), nevirapine (NVP) and efavirenz (EFV)–formed
the first line regimen recommended by the WHO during the time
of the dataset [8–9]. For the purposes of this analysis, they are
referred to as ‘‘first line’’ while others are referred to as ‘‘second
line.’’ Second line compounds, used in the event of treatment
failure, comprised the remaining 4% of drugs in the dataset
(Table 1).
While generic companies provided more first line drugs than did
brand companies, 93% of second line drugs was provided by
brand companies (Table 1). In addition, first and second line drugs
had significantly different price patterns. First line brand drugs
were consistently more costly than first line generic drugs (Table
S1), on average two to three times more expensive ($277/patient
yr brand price vs. $114/ patient yr generic price, Table 1) In
contrast, average brand and generic prices for second line drugs
were roughly equal, with generic prices actually slightly higher
than brand prices on average (Table 1).
Fixed Dose Combinations
Differences were also seen in generic and brand supply patterns of
multiple compound or ‘‘fixed dose’’ combination drugs. Favored
for their simpler compliance and supply requirements, fixed dose
formulations comprised a third of the procurement studied, the
single combination of stavudine, lamivudine, and nevirapine
accounting for 20% of the total (Table 2). Three of the top four
fixed dose combinations were supplied entirely by generic
companies, and combined molecules owned by different brand
companies (Table 2). In contrast, the fourth fixed dose com-
bination (AZT+3TC), supplied by both generic and brand
companies, combined molecules of a single brand company,
GlaxoSmithKline (Table 2).
Patents
Patents confer the right to exclude others from making, using,
selling, offering to sell, or importing an invention and are domestic
in nature. An analysis of drug patent status in countries where
drugs were made, as well as used, is therefore warranted. 85% of
the generic drugs in the dataset were made in India for export and
distribution in Sub-Saharan African countries, with the remainder
manufactured in South Africa (Table 3). Except for drugs made
and consumed in South Africa, the generic drugs in the dataset
were imported for subsequent distribution into Sub-Saharan
African countries. A brand company holding a patent in either
Table 1. First and Second Line Antiretroviral Drugs Procured for Sub-Saharan Africa
..................................................................................................................................................
Drug Name
Volume (patient
year equivalents)
% of Total
Volume
Percentage
Brand
Percentage
Generic
Avg. Brand
Price*
Avg. Generic
Price*
First Line ARVs 522,517 96% 35% 65% 277 114
Second Line ARVs 18,984 4% 93% 7% 591 601
Total 541,501 100% 37% 63% 304 116
N=2,162 orders
Volumes calculated on the basis of WHO daily dosing guidelines to generate patient year equivalents
*Average prices in $/patient yr and calculated on the basis of total $s paid for drugs/total drugs in category.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000278.t001
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Table 2. First Line Fixed Dose Combination Antiretroviral Drugs
..................................................................................................................................................
Fixed Dose Combinations
Volume (patient
year equivalents)
% of Total
Volume
Percentage
Brand
Percentage
Generic
Brand Maker of
Individual Drugs
in Combination*
Stavudine (d4T)+Lamivudine (3TC)+Nevirapine (NVP) 109,971 20% 0% 100% BMS+GSK+BI
Zidovudine (AZT)+Lamivudine (3TC) 61,847 11% 50% 50% GSK
Zidovudine (AZT)+Lamivudine (3TC)+Nevirapine (NVP) 8,006 1% 0% 100% GSK+BMS
Stavudine (d4T)+Lamivudine (3TC) 7,537 1% 0% 100% GSK+BMS
Total 187,361 34% 17% 83% -
N=501 Orders
*BMS=Bristol Myers Squibb, GSK=GlaxoSmithKline, BI=Boehringer Ingelheim
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000278.t002
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Brand v. Generic AIDS Drugs
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 March 2007 | Issue 3 | e278a supplier or consumer jurisdiction could potentially block the
generic production, import, sale, offer to sale, or use of a patented
drug.
Supplier Country Patent Situation
Under Indian patent law, only drug compounds whose earliest
date of patent application or ‘‘priority’’ date falls after January 1,
1995 are eligible for patent product protection [10]. The priority
date status of first line drugs in the dataset is reported in Table 4.
The priority dates associated with all individual first line as well as
the majority of second line drugs in the dataset precede the critical
date. (Second line drugs that have patents with a pre-January 1,
1995 priority date include abacavir, didanosine, ritonavir,
saquinavir, nelfinavir, indinavir; the second line drugs that have
patents with post-January 1, 1995 priority date are tenofovir,
tenofovir/emtricitabine, lopinavir/ritonavir, and zidovudine/la-
muviduine/abacavir [11–12].) Thus, basic versions of the over-
whelming majority of drugs in the dataset were not eligible for
brand company patent product protection in India. However,
India’s revised patent law offers protection to later-developed
formulations, drug combinations, and drug compounds with
priority dates after January 1, 1995 [10].
The generic drugs from South Africa in the dataset were
primarily sourced from a single firm, Aspen Pharmacare Ltd.,
which obtained voluntary licenses from a number of brand
companies to make drugs generically. These licenses are typically
offered on a royalty free basis, and under their terms, brand
companies transfer know-how related to the manufacturing,
testing, and handling of branded drugs, leaving the generic
company to control local distribution [13]. The prices charged by
Aspen were comparable to prices charged by Indian suppliers.
(Indian and South African prices, respectively: $170 v. $149 for
AZT, $64 v. $65 for 3TC, $67 v. $84 for NVP, & $45 v. $48 for
d4T) The overall share of drugs provided by Aspen, assumed to
represent the total produced under voluntary license, was
approximately 9%.
Consumer Country Patent Situation
Unlike in India, in Sub-Saharan Africa brand companies widely
patented three out of the five first line drugs and the one
combination of first line drugs eligible for protection based on
a survey published in 2001 [14] (Table 4). These four drugs
accounted for 45% of the volume of drugs studied (Table S1).
Generic versions of these four drugs were bought even in
countries where they were patented (Table 4). Levels of generic
purchasing in countries where compounds were patented were
comparable to levels of purchasing in countries where the com-
pounds were not patented (Table 4). In some cases (e.g. AZT,
AZT+3TC), generic purchasing levels were actually higher in
patent countries versus non-patent countries (Table 4). The data
suggest that patents are not being strictly enforced in most Sub-
Saharan African countries, and that the presence of patents has
not uniformly deterred generic purchasing. The exceptions to this
pattern are stavudine and efavirenz, which were each patented in
one country, South Africa. The patents on these drugs appear to
be effect in this relatively richer country, which procured no
generic versions of either of them (Table 4).
DISCUSSION
Over the past few years, antiretroviral drugs have been bought in
significant quantities for patients in developing countries for the
first time in their 20-year history [15], largely with international
donor funding. This study presents an empirical study of this
procurement based on transactions of drugs for Sub-Saharan
Africa reported to the Global Price Reporting Mechanism. While
only a subset of the drugs bought, the data have relevance to
Table 3. Sources of Generic Antiretroviral Drugs
......................................................................
Country of Manufacture India South Africa
Generic Volume (patient years) 288,439 51,947
% of Total Generics Volume 85% 15%
% of Total Volume 53% 10%
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000278.t003
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Table 4. Patent and Access Characteristics of First Line Antiretroviral Drugs in Sub-Saharan African Countries
..................................................................................................................................................
Drug Name
Post-Jan 1, 1995
Priority Date?
a
Number of
Sub-Saharan
African Countries
in which drug
patented
b
Percentage of
Total Countries
c
Percentage of Order Volume from Generic
Source
Countries in which
drug patented
d
Countries in which
drug not patented
d
Zidovudine (AZT)+Lamivudine (3TC) Yes 32 84% 54% 46%
Lamivudine (3TC) No 28 74% 62% 68%
Nevirapine (NVP) No 25 66% 48% 59%
Zidovudine (AZT) No 16
e 42% 79% 74%
Stavudine (d4T) No 1 3% 0% 58%
Efavirenz (EFV) No 1 3% 0% 16%
aSource of data: [11,12]
bSource of data: [14] The status of certain patents may have changed since publication, due to the failure to pay renewal fees, for instance. This would lend further
support to the apparent brand company shift away from enforcement of patents in Sub-Saharan Africa.
cTotal Countries=38 countries in which transactions reported
dCalculation performed on the basis of countries that had transactions in that drug category (n=24-31 countries). Number of countries in which drug patented with 0%
generic purchases=5 (AZT+3TC), 2 (3TC), 2 (NVP), 2 (AZT), 1 (d4T), 1 (EFV).
eThe expiry date of the US patent on AZT was September 2005 [11].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000278.t004
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 March 2007 | Issue 3 | e278ongoing debates about the role of brand and generic companies
and how access to patented dugs can be achieved.
First vs. Second Line Drugs
Significant differences between the markets for first and second
line drugs were observed. First line drugs were provided by generic
and brand companies, at relatively lower prices, whereas second
line drugs were supplied almost exclusively by brand companies, at
relatively higher prices. The data lend support to two explanations
for the lack of competition in second line drugs–a lack of demand
volume and patent barriers at the supplier level.
Second line drugs have been procured in lower quantities than
first line drugs. Low volumes over which to spread fixed costs
explain in part why even generic prices for second line drugs
remain high. Nelfinavir, for example, the most procured second
line drug in the dataset, was supplied from generic sources at an
average price of $1021 vs. an average branded price of $980
(Table S1). It should also be borne in mind that generic companies
generally compensate for low margins with high volumes [16].
This may explain in part why second line drugs, with their small
volumes, were supplied almost exclusively by brand companies. As
patients switch to second line drugs, at a forecasted rate of 6–10%
per year of patient therapy [17], demand for these compounds
should grow. While this should encourage greater competition
from generic suppliers, other mechanisms for increasing purchase
volumes, such as bulk or forward purchasing instruments, also
deserve exploration.
In terms of patent barriers, certain second line drugs are eligible
for patent protection in India, the most important supplier of the
generic ARVs studied. Indian patent applications for tenofovir,
abacavir, and abacavir+AZT+3TC have been reported [18].
Demand for tenofovir and abacavir should rise with their recent
promotion to the first line regimen [9], yet the presence of patent
applications generally can cast uncertainty on the generic market
[19]. Recently signed voluntary licenses over tenofovir should be
helpful in this regard [32].
Among first line drugs, the cheapest drugs–generics–do not
appear to be consistently procured, as significant quantities of
higher-priced brand ARVs were ordered. (Table 1) This may be
due to a number of factors, including a lack of transparency about
prices, availability issues, registration problems [19–20], or other
nonprice factors. Further analyses should be undertaken to ensure
that the most affordable drugs can actually be procured.
Patents
The data confirms that generic versions of patented drugs are
being procured in large quantities for Sub-Saharan Africa. They
also suggest that patent barriers to generic supply have been
avoided in various ways. Indian generic suppliers have taken
advantage of the lack of patent protection for pharmaceutical
drugs in India to produce over half of the ARVs in the dataset
(Table 3). In contrast, the South African generic drugs in the
dataset have been produced pursuant to voluntary license
agreements with brand companies. Notably, prices of South
African and Indian generic drugs appear to be comparable.
Questions remain about the impact of the changes to India’s
patent law to the generic supply. As described above, basic
versions of all individual first and many second line drugs–
accounting for the majority of the supply studied–should be
unaffected because of priority dates before the critical date of
January 1, 1995. Demand for first line drugs should remain robust,
driven by the needs of treatment naı ¨ve patients and the majority of
those already being treated with these drugs. For drugs over which
there are patent questions, however, voluntary or compulsory
licenses could be used to foster generic competition.
The apparent lack of patent enforcement over certain first line
drugs in selected Sub-Saharan African countries is notable. Some
companies have formally announced that they will not enforce
patents [21–22] or pursue patent protection in certain markets
[21,23]. Others, it would appear, have informally adopted such
a policy.
Non-enforcement policies that in effect allow generic companies
to produce drugs despite the presence of a patent in some ways
achieve the intent of compulsory licenses without the use of formal
licenses. Companies in turn may be more motivated in part to
adopt such policies knowing that a compulsory license could issue
at some point. International and national efforts to bolster the
legitimacy of compulsory licenses, while at times criticized [24],
deserve some credit for encouraging the access to patented
medicines that has been achieved.
Non-enforcement and price discounting represent two ‘‘volun-
tary’’ measures that are taken by brand companies to reduce the
price of drugs. Brand companies have generally limited price
discounts to poorer countries such as those in Sub-Saharan Africa
[25]. As such, middle-income, ‘‘producer’’ countries such as Brazil
or India, the latter of which has the most HIV-infected patients in
the world [26], are generally excluded [21–22]. The data suggests
that non-enforcement measures have also not been extended to
middle income countries: patents in South Africa over stavudine
and efavirenz are correlated with a lack of generic procurement
there, in contrast to patents elsewhere (Table 4). This means that,
outside of Sub-Saharan Africa and the poorest countries, other
approaches for encouraging generic supply will likely be used.
Thailand, which recently announced it would issue a compulsory
license over efavirenz [27], provides an example of one such
approach.
Brand v. Generic Companies
Finally, while brand and generic companies are often placed on
opposite sides of debates about access to medicines, the data show
that each has made distinct, important contributions. Generic
companies have overcome concerns about quality and gained the
approvals necessary [28] to become the top supplier of ARVs in
the dataset. Relatively freer of licensing and patent constraints,
they have devised widely used fixed dose combination drugs and
encouraged later collaborations between brand companies such as
the 3-in-1drug atripla made by Gilead Sciences and Bristol-Myers
Squibb. They have created a viable, and in many cases cheaper,
alternative to brand drugs.
Brand companies have provided a substantial percentage of the
drugs procured including most second line ARVs studied. They
are not enforcing exclusive patent rights in Sub-Saharan Africa
and have encouraged generic production by entering into
voluntary licenses with generic companies. Although the adverse
impact of compulsory licensing on drug innovation has often been
cited as a reason not to do it, brand companies have continued to
invest in developing new drugs: as of December 2006, there were
reportedly 27 HIV drugs in clinical development, with work on
drugs in several new classes of treatment ongoing [29].
Conclusion
This study has considered a single point in the supply chain for
HIV drugs for Sub-Saharan African countries–pharmaceutical
procurement. While other points in the supply chain, particularly
those related to human resource and domestic infrastructure, pose
urgent challenges [30], continued attention to drug procurement is
Brand v. Generic AIDS Drugs
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AIDS spending [31,32].
The data demonstrate that drugs are being procured from both
generic and brand companies in significant quantities in Sub-
Saharan Africa, and highlight the distinct contributions made by
each supplier segment. In addition, they suggest that a combination
of means, including a lack of product patents in India over older
drugs, voluntary licenses by brand companies, and non-enforce-
ment of patents have encouraged generic production of patented
drugs. Each has its limitations, however–newer drugs are subject
to patent protection in India and other supplier countries,
voluntary licenses only account for a small fraction of the current
procurement, and non-enforcement policies are available only at
the discretion of brand companies and have been implemented
selectively, excluding middle-income South Africa.
In addition, as others have noted, ARV prices are still
significantly high as compared to per capita GDP and in light of
limited local purchasing power [3]. At current cost levels and drug
mix (Table 1), reaching all of the estimated 4.6 million people in
Sub-Saharan Africa in need of ARVs [33] would cost $615M
annually. (This conservative figure does not take into account the
relatively higher cost of child formulation ARVs.) Assuming an 8%
switching rate to second-line regimens and holding other values
constant, this figure nearly doubles by 2010, due to the higher cost
of second line drug prices. These figures indicate a long-term and
increasing, not decreasing role for donors whose taxpayers also
have a stake in the price of ARVs. Furthermore, provisions of
international trade agreements, if enacted into domestic law, may
make regulatory approval of generic drugs in certain countries
harder by limiting access to needed test data [34], which could
limit access. Continued attention to these and other issues should
continue as they will only grow in importance with the planned
scale up of treatment.
SUPPORTING INFORMATION
Table S1 Supporting Information for Table 1
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000278.s001 (0.07 MB
DOC)
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